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Abstract
In the absence of behavioural adjustments, demographic change may cut o↵ about 0.4
to 0.5%-points on average from the annual per capita growth rate in EU countries in the
next 25 years. The behavioural responses of households and firms to declining fertility and
rising life expectancy may significantly change this outcome, but the sign and the size of this
change are unclear. We construct and parameterize a large-scale overlapping generations
model for an open economy to quantify (the net e↵ect of) these behavioural adjustments.
Individuals in the model di↵er not only by age, but also by innate ability. Key endogenous
variables are hours worked, investment in human and physical capital and per capita growth.
Applying the model to the case of Belgium, we find that it replicates key data since about
1960 remarkably well. Simulating the model, we observe that behavioural adjustments by
households and firms contribute to reverse the negative arithmetical e↵ect of projected future
demographic change on per capita growth. However, under the current policies and the
current pension system, these are not strong enough. A net negative e↵ect on annual per
capita growth remains of almost 0.3%-points on average.
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lapping generations
JEL classification: C68, D91, E17, J11, O40
Correspondence: Willem.Devriendt@UGent.be, Freddy.Heylen@UGent.be. We are grateful to Lionel Artige,
Mikkel Barslund, Tim Buyse, Bart Cape´au, Andre´ Decoster, Pierre Devolder, Hans Fehr, Pierre Pestieau, Erik
Schokkaert and Frank Vandenbroucke for useful comments and suggestions during the development of this paper.
We have also benefited from comments at the 31st Annual Conference of the European Society for Population
Economics (Glasgow, 2017) and the 23rd International Conference of the Society for Computational Economics
(New York, 2017). We acknowledge financial support from Belgian Science Policy (BRAIN-be Programme).
1
1 Introduction
Population ageing poses a major challenge to the social security system in all OECD countries.
While aggregate public pension and health care expenditures are expected to rise strongly,
future GDP growth may fall. Belgium is no exception to the phenomenon of ageing. As in other
countries, fertility has gradually declined throughout the twentieth century. This downward
trend was interrupted only during the period of the baby boom in the 1950s and 1960s. At
the same time life expectancy has increased enormously. A child born in Belgium in 2010 can
expect to reach age 90 with a probability of more than 60%. For a child born in 1950 this was
only 30%. Together with the retirement of the baby boom generation since about a decade and
the reduced size of more recent generations, the structural increase in life expectancy will imply
a drastic change in the age distribution of the Belgian population in the period 2010-2040. As
we show in Figure 1, the age dependency ratio, computed as the number of people younger than
18 or older than 64 relative to the population at working age, is expected to rise from about
60% in 2010 to an unprecedented 80% by 2040. Figure 2 depicts the evolution of the size of
the underlying three age groups. Changes in the number of children reflect changes in fertility.
While the number of people older than 64 rises rapidly, the Belgian population at working age
is expected to decline between 2020 and 2040. By 2040 there will be eight dependent persons
for every ten people at working age.
Figure 1: Age dependency ratio in Belgium (%)
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Figure 2: Size of three age groups (millions)
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Data sources: Federal Planning Bureau (2016), Population forecasts 2015-2060, March 2016; Belgian Federal Government
(FPS Economy, Statistics Belgium).
Without behavioural changes in labour supply, education and savings, which may all a↵ect in-
vestment in physical capital, this demographic transformation will certainly cause a significant
loss in per capita output and income. As a matter of simple arithmetic, if fewer active people are
available to produce output for more dependent people, and no one changes his or her behaviour,
lower per capita output is unavoidable (Onder and Pestieau, 2014). Fortunately, individual be-
haviour can change. A large theoretical literature has demonstrated that falling fertility and
increasing life expectancy (ageing) will also a↵ect the incentives for individual households and
firms to work, to save and to invest in human and physical capital. Four major questions remain,
though. Will these incentives go into the right direction? The literature remains ambiguous.
If they go into the right direction, will they be strong enough to reverse the negative e↵ects of
2
demographic transformation? What is the impact of the underlying components of demographic
change (declining fertility versus increasing life expectancy)? And what is the impact of a coun-
try’s structural characteristics and institutions on the sign and the size of the e↵ects of these
incentives? For the last question, one may in particular think of a country’s pension system and
its labour market characteristics. Bloom et al. (2007) and Dedry et al. (2016) for example have
shown that di↵erent pension systems may imply very di↵erent responses in savings and capi-
tal formation. Labour market characteristics will determine to what extent changed incentives
to work feed through into employment rather than unemployment. High minimum wages for
example may induce more unemployment among low skilled individuals when they raise their
labour supply.
To the best of our knowledge, the existing literature does not yet provide clear and compre-
hensive quantitative answers to this set of questions. In a recent survey article, Lee (2016, p.
110) qualifies these or highly similar questions as to be explored further1. Our research agenda
and goal is to answer these questions for Belgium. In this paper we tackle the first three. The
model we build, however, will also allow us in later work to investigate the e↵ect of changes in
the pension system or in some labour market institutions. We focus on one particular country
as this seems by far the most realistic way to proceed, given the specific pattern of demographic
change in each country, the impact of country specific structural and institutional characteris-
tics, and the need for quantitative answers. It goes without saying, though, that our approach
can also be adopted to study other (small) open economies.
To obtain the answers to our questions, several steps need to be taken. First of all, a rich
and realistic parameterized model of the Belgian economy will be necessary. The model should
be rich and realistic in many aspects: demography, employment and unemployment, economic
growth, public finances, di↵erent pillars of the pension system, etc. We construct this model in
the first part of this paper. It will be a 28-period overlapping generations model for an open
economy, facing an exogenous world interest rate, that we calibrate to Belgium. Considering
the complicated and multidimensional issues at stake, next to its overlapping generations setup,
its main characteristics are the following:
(i) fertility and life expectancy are exogenous but time-varying;
(ii) hours worked, human capital and income are all endogenous, which implies the capacity
of the model to capture and measure important behavioural responses to ageing;
(iii) individuals di↵er not only by age, but also by innate ability. We distinguish individuals
with either high, medium or low ability. Individuals with higher ability enter with more
human capital. They are also more productive in building additional human capital and
skills when they allocate time to education. For individuals with low ability, expanding
time in education is not a productive option;
1Clearly, a lot of highly relevant and related work on the macroeconomic e↵ects of demographic change has already
been done, as the survey by Lee (2016) also demonstrates. Quite close to our paper are for example Krueger
and Ludwig (2007), Ludwig et al. (2012), Sa´nchez-Romero (2013), Marchiori et al. (2017) and Attanasio et al.
(2016). Future per capita growth (and its underlying determinants) is not the focus of these papers, though.
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(iv) while the labour market for high and medium ability individuals is perfectly competitive
and clears, there is strong union involvement on the labour market for individuals with
low ability. Above market-clearing wages imply (involuntary) unemployment among low
ability individuals;
(v) the pension system consists of three pillars. The first pillar is a public pay-as-you-go
(PAYG) system. The second consists of pension funds organized by private firms. The
third source of income at old-age is accumulated financial wealth from private saving;
(vi) a rich specification of other aspects of public policy, in particular fiscal policy. At the
revenue side, the government in the model can change (progressive) tax rates on labour,
capital and consumption. At the expenditure side it can change non-employment benefits
for involuntarily unemployed workers, government consumption, and spending on educa-
tion. It can also allocate resources to maintain financial balance in the public pension
system, if necessary.
As a second step, before we use the model for simulations of the future, it should convince in
its capacity to replicate the evolution of key data in the past. We therefore relate the calibrated
model’s predictions for the old-age dependency ratio, per capita growth, capital formation,
employment, education, and inequality to the data in Belgium since about 1960. We find that
the model performs well in this respect. Our third step is the computation of our baseline
simulation. This simulation quantifies the e↵ects of projected future demographic change (and
projected future technical progress) on the endogenous variables in our model until 2061, under
the assumption of unchanged policies and under the main rules of the current pension system.
Major attention will go to our predictions for future per capita growth and its underlying
determinants (employment, physical capital formation, education and human capital formation).
We also report predictions for future pension expenditures as a fraction of GDP. Our predictions
are not optimistic. Arithmetically, i.e. for unchanged household and firm behaviour, projected
demographic change may cut o↵ about 0.4%-points on average of the annual per capita growth
rate in the next 25 years. Although we do observe sizeable (and mostly positive) behavioural
adjustments by households and firms to the demographic transformation, their e↵ects can only
partially counteract the unfortunate arithmetical consequences for per capita growth of the
rapidly increasing dependency ratio. A net negative e↵ect on future per capita growth of almost
0.3%-points remains. The reason is double. Some of the adjustments have already taken place
in previous decades. Furthermore, ongoing adjustments need not a↵ect future domestic output
when (in an open economy) capital induced by higher savings flows out. A growing financial
burden on the public pension system, up to about 1.6% of GDP per year on average in the next
25 years, is one of the other consequences. In future work this baseline simulation will establish
a major benchmark against which to evaluate (the future e↵ects of) alternative policy changes
and pension system reforms.
Our results also contribute to the recent literature on secular stagnation. In line with Gor-
don (2014) and Cervellati et al. (2017), we provide evidence supporting the hypothesis that the
observed and expected long-run slowdown in per capita growth is mainly a supply-side problem,
with demographic change as one of the main ”headwinds”.
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The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we assess the arithmetical e↵ects on
per capita growth of projected demographic change in Belgium in comparison to some other
countries. We also give a brief overview of the potential behavioural responses of households
and firms to demographic change, as discussed in the literature. Section 3 sets out the model. In
Section 4 we describe our calibration procedure and the parameterization of the model. Section
5 demonstrates our model’s capacity to replicate the evolution since about 1960 of key macro
variables. In this section we also describe the evolution of exogenous variables that play a cru-
cial role in the model: demography, fiscal and pension policy variables, the real interest rate,
and the rate of technical progress. In Section 6 we derive and discuss our baseline simulation,
i.e. our prediction of future macroeconomic developments in Belgium until 2061 if we impose
recent projections of future demographic changes and projected future technical progress under
the assumption of unchanged policies and under the main rules of the current pension system.
This baseline simulation allows a first assessment of the macroeconomic and budgetary e↵ects of
ageing in Belgium (assuming constant policies, but allowing endogenous behavioural responses
of households and firms). Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Demographic change and ageing: unfortunate arithmetic and
behavioural e↵ects
In the neoclassical framework that we adopt in this paper, the long-run per capita growth rate
is determined solely by the exogenous rate of technical progress. In long transition periods,
however, per capita growth can be much higher or much lower than technical progress. Demo-
graphic change is a prominent possible cause of such growth deviations. Consider the following
decomposition of per capita output
Yt
Popt
=
Yt
Hourst
Hourst
Nwt
Nwt
Popt
,
where YtHourst is real output per hour worked (or labour productivity),
Hourst
Nwt
hours worked per
person at working age and N
w
t
Popt
the share of people at working age in total population. Taking
growth rates, it then follows that
 Y
Y
  npop = g⇡ + (nhours   nwN )  (npop   nwN ).
The left side of this equation is the annual per capita economic growth rate. On the right g⇡ is
the annual growth rate of labour productivity, npop the growth rate of total population, nhours
the growth rate of total hours worked, and nwN the growth rate of population at working age.
As can easily be seen, demographic change pushes per capita growth below the growth rate of
labour productivity when total population grows faster than population at working age (= rising
dependency, npop > nwN ) and/or when population at working age grows faster than aggregate
hours worked (= falling employment rate, nhours < nwN ). In the very long run dependency and
employment rates will be constant, and labour productivity and per capita output will grow at
the same rate as technology. In long transition periods, however, things may be very di↵erent.
Figure 1 showed us the evolution of the past and projected future overall dependency ratio in
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Belgium. Figure 3 reports the arithmetical e↵ects of this changing dependency on per capita
growth2. We compare Belgium to a few other countries or country groups. Ceteris paribus, the
projected unprecedented rise in the dependency ratio between 2010 and 2040 will have significant
adverse e↵ects on future per capita growth. In the next 25 years it may cut o↵ almost 0.4%-
points on average from annual per capita growth. Compared to other countries, Belgium takes
an intermediate position. In Germany and in the EU28 on average the negative arithmetical
e↵ects of rising dependency are larger (about 0.5%-points on average in the next 25 years). They
are weaker in countries like Sweden and the US (about 0.2 to 0.3%-points). In all countries, and
Germany in particular, these negative arithmetical e↵ects are the strongest in 2020-35.
Figure 3: Arithmetical e↵ect of changing
dependency on per capita growth
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Data sources: Figure 3: see sources of Figures 1 and 2 for Belgium. EU-countries: Eurostat, population statistics and
projections (baseline projections), US: United States Census Bureau; Figure 4: OECD, 2015, Annual Labour Force Statistics;
The Conference Board Total Economy Database, 2015.
The negative e↵ects of a rising dependency ratio on per capita growth can be countered if coun-
tries succeed in raising hours worked among the smaller group of people at working age or the
growth rate of labour productivity (output per hour). Despite some progress in the second half
of the 1990s, Belgium is one of the countries with the poorest labour market performance (Figure
4). Moreover, in the last decade per capita hours worked have again stagnated. The employment
gap between Belgium and other countries is particularly large for older workers and low-skilled
workers (OECD, 2015). At the same time, this gap also creates huge opportunities to counter
low per capita growth if Belgium manages to mobilize this enormous amount of non-employed
labour. As to the growth rate of labour productivity, Belgium also lags behind other countries.
In 1996-2015 the annual growth rate of real GDP per hour worked in Belgium was 1%. In the
EU28 it was almost 1.5% (OECD.Stat, Productivity database, 2016).
The e↵ects of demographic transformation on per capita growth in the medium to long run
are not limited, however, to the arithmetic described above. Demographic change also implies
a change in the structure of the population, and thus in the relative size of di↵erent age groups
2Algebraically, it can be derived that npop   nwN ⇡  DR1+DR , with DR = Pop N
w
Nw , the age dependency ratio as
defined in Figure 1.
6
with di↵erent behaviour. Moreover, and maybe more important, demographic change will also
a↵ect the incentives for individual households to supply labour, to invest in human capital, and
to save. Likewise, it will a↵ect the incentives for firms to hire workers and to invest in physical
capital. Changes in investment behaviour will a↵ect labour productivity. It is unclear from the
literature, however, whether the net e↵ect of all these incentives will be positive for growth or
negative. And if it is positive, whether it will be strong enough to reverse the arithmetical e↵ect
shown in Figure 3.
When it comes to aggregate savings, there are reasons that can justify a decline in response
to demographic change, as well as reasons that would predict an increase. Whereas middle
aged and older workers are net savers, young people and (old) retirees are generally described
as borrowers or dissavers. Considering the demographic transition in Figure 2, the obvious
expectation would be that aggregate savings will gradually be declining as the rising share of
dependent versus active people should soon feed through in a rising fraction of dissavers (see e.g.
IMF, 2014; Goodhart and Erfurth, 2014). Increasing life expectancy, however, may imply the
opposite. Individuals prefer to smooth consumption over their whole lifetime. The perspective of
living longer may then force them to increase their savings during their active life (Krueger and
Ludwig, 2007; Onder and Pestieau, 2014). A key element determining the extent to which this
will happen, is the retirement decision and the length of working life. The ambition to maintain
consumption during old age will also provide an incentive for individuals to work longer and
to postpone retirement, at least if good health and productivity can be assumed (Bloom et al.,
2007; Heijdra and Reijnders, 2017). The stronger the reaction in labour supply, the smaller will
be the need to increase savings at middle age.
Increasing life expectancy does not only provide an incentive to work longer. It will also
increase the incentive for individuals to invest in education, at least if they have the ability to
do so. The reason is obvious. If people expect to live longer - starting with reduced mortality
during normal working ages - and if they expect to work longer, accumulated human capital
will be productive for a longer period of time. All this raises the return to investment in
education (Ben-Porath, 1967; Cervellati and Sunde, 2013; Ludwig et al., 2012; Heylen and Van
de Kerckhove, 2013).
The response of individuals regarding saving, working and schooling, will matter a great deal
for firms’ investment in physical capital. For given (constant) individual behaviour, demographic
change will most likely imply disinvestment. If fertility and the size of working age population
decline, this will cause an increase in the capital-labour ratio and reduce the marginal produc-
tivity of physical capital. The lower rate of return to physical capital may then lead to a fall in
investment (Ludwig et al., 2012; Heylen and Van de Kerckhove, 2013). Also, if there are fewer
workers, this will reduce the simple need for equipment (Summers, 2014)3. If individuals adjust
their behaviour, however, the outcome may be very di↵erent. An increase in savings may push
down the interest rate, and reduce the cost of investment. Increased labour supply and/or post-
ponement of retirement, and increased accumulation of human capital will raise the marginal
productivity of physical capital, and counteract the negative e↵ect of a decline in population
3Not everyone agrees, however. According to Goodhart and Erfurth (2014), a shrinking working age population
may imply the end of cheap labour. The relative cost of capital may then fall, which will encourage firms to
invest in physical capital.
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aged 18 to 64. An important element here is the extent to which the interest rate can indeed
fall. Given our focus on Belgium, we model in this paper an open economy. A fall in the interest
rate and an increase in domestic investment are then not obvious, as savings may simply be
invested abroad (capital outflow). This will be the case if the rate of return to physical capital
abroad is higher than at home. In the end, what matters is relative ageing in the home economy
versus abroad, as well as the relative response of labour supply and schooling.
If one thing is clear from this discussion, it is that demographic change a↵ects household and
firm behaviour in many ways. Uncovering overall net e↵ects on the macro economy will require
a coherent general equilibrium model. It is our aim to construct this model in Section 3.
3 The model
Our analytical framework consists of a computable 28 period OLG model for an open economy.
We impose an exogenous world interest rate and assume physical capital to move freely across
borders. Human capital and labour however are assumed internationally immobile. As we want
to assess the e↵ects of ageing on the economy, an important block of the model is demography.
We impose exogenous fertility and survival rates. Changes in these rates will be the main
shocks hitting the economy in later sections. Twenty-eight generations of individuals coexist.
Individuals enter the model at the age of 18. They live at most for 28 periods of 3 years.
Within each generation one fraction of the individuals is assumed to have low innate ability,
others have medium ability, a third group has high innate ability. What we have in mind are
exogenous di↵erences in IQ. Depending on their ability, individuals will enter the model with a
di↵erent initial human capital endowment and with a di↵erent productivity of schooling. Young
individuals with high or medium ability will continue education when they enter the model at
18. Individuals with low ability will not. Next to endogenous human capital, our model also has
endogenous employment. Besides studying (for high and medium ability individuals) everyone
optimally allocates time to labour and leisure. The labour market for high and medium ability
households is assumed perfectly competitive. The labour market for low ability households is
imperfectly competitive. We assume the existence of a union that sets wages for low ability
workers. Above market-clearing wages may cause involuntary unemployment. As to output,
domestic firms are modelled to employ physical capital and e↵ective labour under constant
returns to scale. Technology is assumed to have exogenous growth.
A central part of our model is the three pillar pension system tailored to Belgium, which
will allow us to simulate a great variety of both parametric and non-parametric pension reforms
in future work. Finally, the government is an important actor in our model also from the side
of fiscal policy. It sets tax rates on labour (both on employees and employers), consumption
and capital income. It allocates its resources to public consumption, productive expenditures,
non-employment benefits and pensions (to finance possible deficits in the public pay-as-you-go
system). It may also borrow.
Concerning notation, superscript t denotes the time an individual or group of individuals
(a generation) enter the model. Subscript j refers to the j-th period of life or, di↵erently put,
the age. It goes from 1 to 284. When a subscript s is used, it denotes one of three levels of
4Note that life starts at age 1 and not at age 0. N t3 for example denotes the total population size of those that
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innate ability: low (L), medium (M) or high (H). Last but not least, time subscripts t added
to aggregate variables indicate historical time.
3.1 Demography
Individuals of either high, medium or low innate ability enter the model at age 18 and stay
until at most age 101. Every period in the model represents three years. Two key mechanisms
describe demographic change: fertility and length of life5. Equation 1 expresses the size of
the youngest or ‘newborn’ cohort at time t relative to the size of the youngest cohort at t-1
following among others de la Croix et al. (2013) and Me´rette and Georges (2009). ft (> 0) is
the time-dependent and exogenous ’fertility’ rate in the model.
N t1 = ftN
t 1
1 (1)
Equation 2 describes the evolution of the size of a specific generation over time. Every individual
is confronted with a chance of surviving to the next age j conditional on reaching age j   1.
This probability is denoted by the exogenous survival rate srtj 1 ( 1) that is both generation
and age-dependent.
N tj = sr
t
j 1N
t
j 1 (2)
Finally, the population consists of low, medium and high ability agents:
N tj = N
t
j,L +N
t
j,M +N
t
j,H
= (vL + vM + vH)N
t
j (3)
with vs denoting their respective shares. Assuming the fertility and survival rates to be equal
across ability types, these shares will be constant. In our calibration later we will assume each
ability group to have an equal share 1/3.
3.2 Households
Individuals of the same generation and ability are grouped in a representative household of
unitary mass (Merz, 1995; Andolfatto, 1996; Boone and Heylen, 2015). As low ability individuals
can be involuntarily unemployed, their household will consist both of a fraction of unemployed
(u) and a fraction of employed members (1   u). They pool their income, so consumption is
equalized across household members. Medium and high ability households have only employed
members.
are born in t and are of age 3. They will be of age 3 in time period t+ 2.
5In line with our assumption that only physical capital is internationally mobile, we do not model migration. Our
data for the exogenous fertility rate do, however, capture the impact of migration of individuals not older than
20. They also include the children of migrants when these children reach age 18 (see Appendix D). As we show
later in this paper (Figure 12d), with this approach we are able to produce an old-age dependency ratio that
matches reality very well.
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3.2.1 Instantaneous household utility
The instantaneous utility function of a representative high or medium ability household of age
j born at time t depends positively on consumption ctj,s and leisure time l
t
j,s (Eq. 4). Prefer-
ences are logarithmic in consumption and iso-elastic in leisure. The intertemporal elasticities of
substitution in consumption and leisure are respectively 1 and 1/✓. The instantaneous utility
function of a low ability household of age j is the same except that only the leisure time of
the employed fraction of the household (1  ut+j 1) is taken into account (Eq. 5). Implicitly,
leisure of the unemployed fraction is assumed to be neutral for household utility. A similar
utility function is now widely used in business cycle models with search and matching frictions,
e.g. Tomas (2008).
u(ctj,s, l
t
j,s) = lnc
t
j,s +  j
(ltj,s)
1 ✓
1  ✓ , for s = H,M (4)
u(ctj,L, l
t
j,L) = lnc
t
j,L +  j (1  ut+j 1)
(ltj,L)
1 ✓
1  ✓ (5)
3.2.2 Expected lifetime utility
A household that enters the model at time t maximizes lifetime utility described by Equation 6
subject to its budget and time constraints (cf. infra). In this equation   is the discount factor
and ⇡tj the unconditional probability to survive until age j.
U t =
28X
j=1
 j 1⇡tju(c
t
j,s, l
t
j,s) (6)
with 0 <   < 1, ⇡t1 = 1, 0 < ⇡
t
j =
Qj 1
i=1 sr
t
i < 1 for 1 < j < 29, and ⇡
t
29 = 0.
3.2.3 Time constraints
Every period, an individual is endowed with one unit of time that can be split into hours worked
while employed (n), education (e) and leisure (l) depending on age and innate ability. Equations
7 to 9 describe the age-dependent time constraints for medium and high ability individuals
(s =M,H). Only in the first 4 periods an individual can spend time in post-secondary education
next to working and enjoying leisure. From period 5 until 15, time can exclusively be allocated
to labour and leisure. From period 16 onwards an agent is eligible for public old-age pensions.
Equations 10 and 11 relate to low ability individuals with a job. Since these individuals start
working earlier than individuals of medium or high ability, they can also leave the labour market
earlier, and receive a public pension earlier. Unemployed low ability individuals cannot choose
hours worked or leisure. They only have ‘leisure’. As mentioned before, this does not carry
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positive utility though.
for j = 1  4 (age 18  29) : ltj,s = 1  ntj,s   etj,s (7)
for j = 5  15 (age 30  62) : ltj,s = 1  ntj,s (8)
for j = 16  28 (age 63  101) : ltj,s = 1 (9)
for j = 1  14 (age 18  59) : ltj,L = 1  ntj,L (10)
for j = 15  28 (age 60  101) : ltj,L = 1 (11)
Note our assumption that all individuals of active age are expected to participate on the labour
market. Our model does not exclude however that they optimally choose zero hours. In par-
ticular individuals who are close to qualifying for public pensions and individuals with low
productivity may do so, depending on their taste for leisure, after-tax wages, costs of getting to
the job, and their accumulated wealth6.
3.2.4 Budget constraints
Households have varying budget constraints over their lifecycle depending on age and innate
ability. Equation 12 describes the budget constraint faced by households of high and medium
ability during active life (periods 1 to 15).
(1 + ⌧c)c
t
j,s + a
t
j,s =(1 + rt+j 1)(a
t
j 1,s + trt+j 1) + w
s
t+j 1"jh
t
j,sn
t
j,s(1  ⌧w,j,s   pf1)
  Tj,sntj,s + zt+j 1 , for s=H,M (12)
Disposable income is used to consume ctj,s and accumulate non-human wealth. We denote by
atj,s the stock of wealth held by a type s individual at the end of the j-th period of his life.
⌧c is the tax rate applied by the government on consumption goods. When individuals assign
a fraction ntj,s of their time to work, with productive e ciency "jh
t
j,s, they earn a net labour
income of wst+j 1"jhtj,sntj,s(1  ⌧w,j,s   pf1). Underlying factors are the real gross wage per unit
of e↵ective labour of ability-type s (wst+j 1), an exogenous parameter linking productivity to
age ("j), human capital (htj,s), the average labour income tax rate (⌧w,j,s) and the employee
contribution rate to the ’second pillar’ pension fund (pf1). The contribution rate cr1 of workers
to the first pillar pension system is included in ⌧w,j,s. Engaging in work, however, also induces
costs related to child care and transportation Tj,s. Moreover, if the individuals in a household
work more days a week and more weeks per year, implying higher n, these costs will rise. This
explains why we have Tj,sntj,s in the budget constraint. One reason for T to depend on ability
is for example the use of company cars, which make transportation cheaper typically for higher
ability individuals. A reason for T to depend on age is the need (to pay for) for child care at
low j, when households have children.
6Our modelling of eligibility to public pensions before the statutory retirement age of 65 matches reality in
Belgium. In 1965-70 for example the e↵ective retirement age was 63 for men and women on average. In 2005-10
it was 60 (OECD, Statistics on average e↵ective age of retirement). Actual data on per capita hours worked by
age that we show in Appendix C, are consistent with this modelling choice.
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Next to labour income, disposable income consists of interest income earned on assets,
rt+j 1atj 1,s with rt+j 1 the exogenous world real interest rate, and lump-sum transfers received
from the government zt+j 1. A final source of income are transfers from accidental bequests
trt+j 1 (plus interest). There are no annuity markets in our model. Per capita transfers from
accidental bequests consist of both regular assets and assets of the second pillar pension fund
(spptj,s) of people who died in the previous period. These are uniformly distributed among the
population:
trk =
1
Nk
24X
s
15X
j=1
⇣
1  srk jj
⌘⇣
ak jj,s + spp
k j
j,s
⌘
Nk jj,s
+
X
s
28X
j=16
⇣
1  srk jj
⌘
ak jj,s N
k j
j,s
35
Equation 13 states that from the eligible pension age onwards (starting from period 16 for
individuals of high and medium ability who continued education at the tertiary level), people
receive public pension benefits ppttj,s and use these, together with their accumulated assets, to
finance consumption. In the first period of retirement, an individual additionally receives his
or her one-time second pillar pension amount, spptj,s which consists of both capital and accrued
interest (cf. Section 3.6).
(1 + ⌧c)c
t
j,s + a
t
j,s = (1 + rt+j 1)(a
t
j 1,s + trt+j 1) + spp
t
j,s + ppt
t
j,s + zt+j 1 (13)
The budget constraint of low ability households at working age (Equation 14) looks slightly
di↵erent. Here, only the employed fraction of the representative household (1  ut+j 1) earns a
labour income while the unemployed part receives an unemployment benefit b related to what
they would have earned when employed.
(1 + ⌧c)c
t
j,L + a
t
j,L = (1 + rt+j 1)(a
t
j 1,L + trt+j 1) + bw
L
t+j 1"jh
t
j,Ln
t
j,Lut+j 1
+ wLt+j 1"jh
t
j,L (1  ut+j 1)ntj,L(1  ⌧w,j,L   pf1)  Tj,L (1  ut+j 1)ntj,L + zt+j 1 (14)
After retirement (from age j = 15 onwards) the budget constraint of low ability households is
the same as the one of high or medium ability households.
(1 + ⌧c)c
t
j,L + a
t
j,L = (1 + rt+j 1)(a
t
j 1,L + trt+j 1) + spp
t
j,L + ppt
t
j,L + zt+j 1 (15)
All households in our model are born without family assets and don’t plan to leave bequests,
i.e. atj,s at model ages 0 and 28 is 0.
3.3 Human capital production
Individuals enter the model at the age of 18 with a predetermined ability-specific endowment of
human capital. In Equation 16, h0 stands for the initial time-invariant human capital endowment
of a high ability individual. Low and medium ability individuals are respectively endowed with
lower human capital stocks ✓Lh0 and ✓Mh0 with 0 < ✓L < ✓M < ✓H = 1.
ht1,s = ✓sh0 (16)
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High as well as medium ability individuals can engage in higher education to accumulate ad-
ditional human capital in the first four periods (Equation 17a). Human capital accumulation
also rises in productive government expenditures gy (in % of GDP).  s is a positive ability-
related e ciency parameter reflecting the productivity of schooling,   the elasticity of human
capital growth with respect to time input and  the elasticity with respect to productive gov-
ernment expenditures. After the first four periods, human capital remains constant (Equation
17b). We assume that learning-by-doing o↵sets depreciation. Constant human capital, however,
doesn’t imply constant productive e ciency htj"j , as there is still variation in the exogenous
age-productivity link "j .
htj+1,s = h
t
j,s +  s(e
t
j,s)
 (gy)
htj,s for j = 1  4, s = H,M (17a)
= htj,s for j   5, s = H,M (17b)
with: 0 <  , < 1,
 H , M > 0.
When we define xtj+1,s as individual human capital growth from one period to the next, we can
rewrite Equation 17a as follows:
htj+1,s = h
t
j,s
 
1 +  s(e
t
j,s)
 (gy)

 
= htj,sx
t
j+1,s (18)
Individuals with low innate ability do not study at the tertiary level. Their human capital
remains constant at the initial level:
htj+1,L = h
t
1,L. 8j (19)
3.4 Household optimization
Low ability individuals will choose consumption and labour supply to maximize Equation 6,
taking into account their instantaneous utility function (Equation 5), their time and budget
constraints (Equations 10, 11, 14 and 15) and the human capital process (Equations 16 and 19).
Individuals of medium and high ability will in addition choose the fraction of time they spend
in education when young. They optimize Equation 6, taking into account Equation 4, and their
time and budget constraints and the human capital formation process described by Equations
7-9, 12-13 and 16-17. For details on the optimality conditions, we refer to Appendix B.
3.5 Firms, output and factor prices
Firms act competitively on the output market. The constant returns to scale production function
to produce a homogeneous good is given by
Yt = K
↵
t (AtHt)
1 ↵ with 0 < ↵ < 1 (20)
At = ga,tAt 1 (21)
In equation 20, Kt is the stock of physical capital at time t, while AtHt indicates employed labour
in e ciency units at time t. The variable At denotes technology that grows at an exogenous
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rate ga,t, the rate of labour augmenting technical progress, and Ht is total e↵ective labour. It
is defined in Equation 22 as a CES-aggregate of e↵ective labour performed by the three ability
groups. In this equation ⌘H , ⌘M and ⌘L are the share parameters. They sum to 1.   denotes
the elasticity of substitution between the ability types of labour.
Ht =
⇣
⌘HH
1 (1/ )
H,t + ⌘MH
1 (1/ )
M,t + ⌘LH
d,1 (1/ )
L,t
⌘ /(  1)
(22)
E↵ective labour supply of the high and medium ability group (Hs,t) is specified as
Hs,t =
15X
j=1
N t j+1j,s n
t j+1
j,s h
t j+1
j,s "j (23)
Our assumption of a competitive labour market for high and medium ability individuals implies
that the total supply of e↵ective labour will equal demand and employment for these individuals
(Hs,t = Hds,t for s = M,H). For low ability households, however, e↵ective employment may be
lower than supply (HL,t > HdL,t, Eq. 24). There is unemployment.
HdL,t =
14X
j=1
N t j+1j,L n
t j+1
j,L h
t j+1
j,L "j(1  ut) (24)
= (1  ut)HL,t (25)
This brings us to wage formation and union involvement. For medium and high ability labour,
the labour market and wage formation are assumed to be competitive. The total wage cost per
unit of e↵ective labour will be equal to the market-clearing marginal labour productivity (Eq.
26). ⌧p is the employer social contribution rate and pf2 the employer contribution rate to the
second pillar pension fund.
(1  ↵)At
✓
Kt
AtHt
◆↵
⌘s
✓
Ht
Hs,t
◆ 1
 
= wst (1 + ⌧p + pf2), for s=H,M (26)
For low ability labour, however, wages will be above the competitive level due to minimum
wages and/or union influence. Firms will therefore choose the optimizing unemployment rate
among low ability individuals (Sommacal, 2006; Fanti & Gori, 2011) (Eq. 27).
(1  ↵)At
✓
Kt
AtHt
◆↵
⌘L
✓
Ht
(1  ut)HL,t
◆ 1
 
= wLt (1 + ⌧p + pf2) (27)
The union wage wLt is defined in Equation 28 as a markup on top of a reference wage. As in
Boone and Heylen (2015) this reference wage is a weighted average of the competitive wage
wL,ct , the average wage of the medium and high ability group 1/2 ⇤
 
wMt + w
H
t
 
and the unem-
ployment benefit. The competitive wage is the hypothetical wage that would occur if there was
no unemployment among low ability households. The weights q1, q2 and q3 sum to 1. We take
their values from Boone and Heylen (2015). (1 + µ) is the wage premium which we calibrate.
wLt =
✓
q1w
L,c
t + q2
wMt + w
H
t
2
+ q3bw
L
t
◆
⇤ (1 + µ) (28)
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Furthermore, firms install physical capital up to the point where the after-tax marginal product
of capital net of depreciation equals the exogenous world interest rate rt:"
↵
✓
AtHt
Kt
◆1 ↵
   
#
(1  ⌧k) = rt (29)
with   the depreciation rate of physical capital, and ⌧k a tax paid by firms on capital returns.
If the net marginal product of capital exceeds the world interest rate, capital will flow in until
equality is restored. For a given interest rate, firms will install more capital when the amount
of e↵ective labour increases or the capital tax rate falls.
3.6 A three pillar pension system
Our model includes a three pillar pension system. The first pillar is the public pay-as-you-go
(PAYG) pension scheme that makes pension payments to retirees out of contributions (taxes)
paid by current workers and firms. The second pillar makes a one-time pension payment (capital
plus accrued interest) to retirees equal to their own accumulated contributions to a pension fund
complemented by the contributions of firms. Finally, the third pillar is nothing more than the
individual’s stock of assets available at the time of retirement.
Individuals receive a first pillar public pension from model age j = 16 (high/medium) or
j = 15 (low) onwards (i.e. respectively actual age 63 or 60). The amount ppttj,s they receive at
the time of retirement is
pptt16,s = rrs
8<:
15X
j=1
pjw
s
t+j 1"jh
t
j,sn
t
j,s(1  ⌧w,j,s)
15Y
l=j
wgt+l
9=; , for s=H,M (30a)
or
pptt15,L = rrL
8<:
14X
j=1
(pj (1  ut+j 1) + puj ut+j 1)wLt+j 1"jhtj,Lntj,L(1  ⌧w,j,L)
14Y
l=j
wgt+l
9=; . (30b)
The pension benefit is related to one’s own contributions during active life. More precisely,
the pensioner receives a fraction of the weighted average of revalued earlier net labour income.
In this equation, pj determines the weight of net labour income earned in period j, rr is the
net replacement rate and wg is the period-wise revaluation factor applied to labour income
earned in the past. The pension will rise in the earned wage, the individual’s hours of work
and his productive e ciency. For retired low ability households the pension amount looks very
similar, except for the lower eligibility age of 60 and the weights attached to each period j ’s
net labour income. These become pj (1  ut+j 1)+ puj ut+j 1 as households have both employed
and unemployed members. puj determines how unemployment is treated in the calculation of
the first pillar pension amount.
After the initial pension payment, the pension benefit might be revalued to adjust for changed
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living standards so ppttj,s then becomes
ppttj,s = ppt
t
16,s
jY
l=17
pgt+l 1, for j>16 and s=H,M (31a)
or
ppttj,L = ppt
t
15,L
jY
l=16
pgt+l 1, for j>15 (31b)
with pgk the coe cient that revalues the pension benefit of k   1 to k.
The first pillar’s budget identity is as follows:
X
s=M,H
28X
j=16
N t+1 jj,s ppt
t+1 j
j,s +
28X
j=15
N t+1 jj,L ppt
t+1 j
j,L =
cr
X
s=M,H
15X
j=1
N t+1 jj,s n
t+1 j
j,s w
s
t "jh
t+1 j
j,s + cr
14X
j=1
N t+1 jj,L (1  ut)nt+1 jj,L wLt "jht+1 jj,L +GPPt (32)
with
cr = cr1 + cr2.
The left side of Equation 32 indicates total pension expenditures at time t. As the first pillar
is organized on a PAYG basis, this amount is financed by a) the working population from taxes
on their gross labour income applying contribution rate cr1 and by b) the firms applying cr2.
Tailored to institutional reality in Belgium, GPPt denotes the total resources assigned to pension
payments by the government to ensure that Equation 32 holds.
When an individual reaches the retirement age he obtains a one-time payment out of the
second pillar pension fund. Every period the individual’s pension fund account is credited by
credittj,s = (pf1 + pf2)w
s
t+j 1h
t
j,s"jn
t
j,s (33)
for s = H,M,L, at least if the individual has a job. This will be the case for all individuals of
high and medium ability, but only for a fraction (1  ut+j 1) of the low ability households.
Consequently, upon retirement the total amount an individual receives is
sppt16,s =
15X
j=1
credittj,s
15Y
k=j
(1 + rt+k) , for s=H,M (34)
or
sppt15,L =
14X
j=1
credittj,L
14Y
k=j
(1 + rt+k) . (35)
3.7 Fiscal Government
Equation 36 describes the government’s budget constraint. Its revenues consist of taxes on
labour income paid by workers Tnt, taxes on capital Tkt, employer taxes on labour income Tpt
and consumption taxes Tct. They are allocated to interest payments on outstanding debt rtBt,
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productive expenditures Gyt, government consumption Gct, pension payments GPPt, unemploy-
ment benefits UBt and lump-sum transfers Zt. Note that the government claims fractions gy
and gc of GDP for its productive expenditures and consumption. Fiscal deficits explain the
issuance of new government bonds (Bt+1  Bt).
Bt+1  Bt = rtBt +Gyt +Gct +GPPt + UBt + Zt   Tnt   Tkt   Tct   Tpt (36)
with:
Gyt = gyYt (37)
Gct = gcYt (38)
UBt = b
14X
j=1
wLt "jh
t+1 j
j,L utn
t+1 j
j,L N
t+1 j
j,L (39)
GPPt = see Equation 32
Tnt =
X
s=M,H
15X
j=1
(⌧w,j,s   cr1)wst "jht+1 jj,s nt+1 jj,s N t+1 jj,s (40)
+
14X
j=1
(⌧w,j,L   cr1)wLt "jht+1 jj,L nt+1 jj,L N t+1 jj,L
Tkt = ⌧kKt

↵
Yt
Kt
   
 
= ⌧k [↵Yt    Kt] (41)
Tct = ⌧c
X
s
28X
j=1
N t+1 jj,s c
t+1 j
j,s (42)
Tpt = (⌧p   cr2)
X
s
wstH
d
s,t (43)
Zt = zt
28X
j=1
N t+1 jj (44)
Labour income taxes paid by workers ⌧w,j,s are progressive. Following Boone and Heylen (2015),
this is modelled by using a tax function
⌧w,j,s =  
✓
yj,s
y˜
◆⇠
with s = (L,M,H) , ⇠   0, 0 <    1 (45)
where yj,s is gross labour income of a household of ability s and age j, and y˜ is average gross
labour income. As in Guo and Lansing (1998) and Koyuncu (2016), ⇠ and   govern the level
and slope of the tax schedule. The marginal tax rate ⌧wm,j,s is the rate applied to the last euro
earned:
⌧wm,j,s =
@ (⌧w,j,syj,s)
@yj,s
= (1 + ⇠) 
✓
yj,s
y˜
◆⇠
(46)
Dividing Equation 46 by 45 yields
⌧wm,j,s
⌧w,j,s
= (1 + ⇠) . (47)
This means that the marginal tax rate is higher than the average tax rate when ⇠ > 0, i.e. the
tax schedule is said to be progressive. Households are aware of the progressive structure of the
17
tax system when making decisions. Note that, consequently, in the budget constraints average
tax rates are used, while in the first-order conditions (cf. Appendix B) marginal tax rates are
used.
3.8 Aggregate equilibrium and the current account
As we assume an open economy, aggregate domestic demand can di↵er from supply and income.
Equation 48 describes aggregate equilibrium defined for all generations living at time t.
Yt = Ct + It +Gct +Gyt +NXt (48)
with:
NXt = CAt   rtFt (49)
Ft = ⌦t + SPPt  Kt  Bt (50)
CAt = Ft+1   Ft =  ⌦t+1 + SPPt   Kt+1   Bt+1 (51)
It =  Kt+1 +  Kt (52)
Equation 49 states that net exports NXt are equal to the current account CAt excluding net
factor income from abroad rtFt where Ft stands for net foreign assets. Aggregate accumulated
private wealth consists of ’normal’ assets ⌦t and accumulated second pillar pension assets SPPt.
It can be allocated to physical capital Kt, domestic government bonds Bt and foreign assets Ft
(Equation 50). Equation 51 denotes that a surplus on the current account translates into more
foreign assets. Equation 52 is the well-known identity relating investment to the evolution of
the physical capital stock.
4 Parameterization and calibration procedure
A first set of parameters is taken from the literature or from existing datasets. For the discount
factor   we impose a value of 0.9423, which is equivalent to a rate of time preference equal to 2%
per year (see e.g. Barro, 1990). The value of ✓, i.e. the reciprocal of the intertemporal elasticity
to substitute leisure, is 2. Estimates for this parameter used in the literature, lie somewhere
between 1 and 10. Micro studies often reveal very low elasticities (i.e. high ✓). However, given
our macro focus, these studies may not be the most relevant ones. Rogerson and Wallenius
(2009) show that micro and macro elasticities may be unrelated. Rogerson (2007) also adopts
a macro framework. He puts forward a reasonable range for ✓ from 1 to 3 (Rogerson, 2007, p.
12).
We impose a share coe cient ↵ of physical capital of 0.375 and a depreciation rate of 4.1%
per year (Feenstra et al., 2015, Penn World Table 8.1). The latter implies   = 0.118 considering
that one period in the model consists of 3 years. Following Caselli and Coleman (2006), who
state that the empirical labour literature consistently estimates values between 1 and 2, we set
the elasticity of substitution   between the three ability types in e↵ective labour equal to 1.5. In
the human capital production function, we choose a conservative value of 0.3 for the elasticity
with respect to education time ( ). This value is within the range considered by Bouzahzah
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et al. (2002) and Docquier and Paddison (2003), but much lower than the value imposed by Lu-
cas (1990). The literature provides much less guidance for the calibration of the relative initial
human capital of low and medium ability individuals relative to the initial human capital of high
ability individuals, ✓L and ✓M . To determine these parameters we follow Buyse et al. (2017)
who rely on PISA science scores. We use the average of the test scores of students at the 17th
percentile as representative for low ability individuals, the 50th percentile as representative for
medium ability individuals, and the test score of students at the 83rd percentile as representative
for high ability individuals. The science test score of Belgian students at the 17th percentile
is 65.3% of the test score of students at the 83rd percentile, while the test score of students
at the 50th percentile is 82.6% of the test score of students at the 83rd percentile. ✓L and ✓M
are correspondingly set equal to 0.653 and 0.826. The value of the elasticity of human capital
production with respect to productive government investment  is much more debatable. The
available evidence in the literature concerns estimates for the elasticity with respect to public
education spending rather than the wider concept of productive government investments which
is mainly our theoretical concept. These available estimates range from 0 (Coleman et al., 1996)
to 0.12 (Card and Krueger, 1992) or even higher (Blankenau et al., 2007). Blankenau and Simp-
son (2004) use a value of 0.10 while Fouge`re et al. (2009) and Annabi et al. (2011) adopt 0.18.
Given the uncertainty surrounding this parameter we choose a moderate value of 0.12 for  in
order to avoid overestimating the e↵ects of public productive expenditures on human capital.
The parameter ⇠ of the tax function (cf. Equation 45) is chosen so that it generates the right
amount of progressivity during the calibration period. The data with which we compare the tax
function’s values concern the observed di↵erences in average personal income tax rates between
three income groups (67 %, 100% and 150% of the average wage, OECD Tax Database, Table
I.5). Minimizing the average root mean squared error between data and function values results
in a value for ⇠ of 0.332. The weights used in the determination of the union’s reference wage q1,
q2 and q3 are 0.8, 0.05 and 0.15 respectively and taken from Boone and Heylen (2015). The last
parameters that we took directly from the literature are the age-specific productivity parameters
✏j . We follow the hump-shaped pattern imposed by Miles (1999) and Courne`de and Gonand
(2006).
A second set of parameters is determined by calibration. Our calibration procedure is based on
Ludwig et al. (2011). It consists of six steps.
1. We obtain an initial guess of the parameters by calibrating for a steady state as this is
easy and fast. As calibration period we take 1996-2007 and impose a stationary population
distribution by assuming survival rates and fertility rates to be constant. Parameters are
determined to match observed averages of key data in the calibration period. These data
concern hours worked by age (averaged over the three ability types), average participation
in education by ability, the unemployment rate among the individuals of low ability and
wage di↵erentials between ability groups. This yields a total of 20 moments.
2. Using the parameters from step 1, we calculate an artificial initial steady state. As our
demographic data are only available from 1948, we use this year as starting point. The
population distribution is again stationary at this point.
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3. We feed the demographics, the world interest rate, the rate of technical progress and data
on policy variables into the model as exogenous driving forces and calcultate the transition
path to the new steady state.
4. We calculate the simulated averages along the transition and compare them with the
real moments in the calibration period (1996-2007). These may di↵er quite substantially.
To take this into account, overestimation or underestimation ratios are calculated (i.e.
simulated moments divided by real moments).
5. The calibration targets of step 1 are rescaled by multiplying them with the inverse of these
ratios.
6. We repeat steps 1 to 5 until the distance between simulated and real moments (i.e. the
mean squared error) in 1996-2007 is minimized. Appendix A contains the outcome of
this calibration procedure, i.e. for each of the calibration targets we report the final
overestimation or underestimation ratio.
The e ciency parameters in human capital production ( M and  H) are determined to
match the participation in post-secondary and tertiary education of individuals of age 18 to 29
in Belgium (see Appendix C.2). Following Buyse et al. (2017), we calibrate the share parameters
in aggregate e↵ective labour (⌘H , ⌘M and ⌘L ) to match observed pre-tax earnings di↵erentials
between workers with di↵erent skills. Data on relative earnings for Belgium are available from
OECD Education at a Glance. We use the data for workers of age 25 to 64. In line with
our overall approach, we consider earnings of a worker without higher secondary education as
representative for low ability individuals, and earnings of a worker with a secondary degree but
no tertiary degree as representative for workers with medium ability. The earnings of a worker
with a tertiary degree are assumed representative for workers with high ability. Calibrating ⌘s
to match the relative wages of these workers (low versus high: 69%, low versus medium: 90%),
yields values of 0.417, 0.328 and 0.256 for ⌘H , ⌘M and ⌘L respectively. The taste for leisure
parameters  j with j = 1   15 have been calibrated to match the average (over the three skill
categories) of per capita hours worked in the 15 age groups in Belgium. We report the data
by ability group in Appendix C. We have set the cost to get at work, Tj,s, at zero for high
ability households, as reference. For the other two ability types Tj,s has been determined to
match average ability-specific hours worked over two large age groups: the first four periods of
active life and the remaining periods of active life. Our calibration points to higher costs in the
first four periods. One way to rationalize these, relates to the costs of child care for working
parents. Finally, we calibrated the union wage premium to match the observed unemployment
rate among individuals without higher secondary degree in the calibration period 1996-2007, i.e.
12.9% (cf. Appendix C). An overview of all parameter values is provided in Table 1.
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Table 1: Parameterization of the model
Parameter Description Value
↵ Production share of capital 0.3749
  Elasticity of substitution between workers of di↵erent ability 1.5
✓ Inverse of the intertemporal elasticity to substitute leisure 2
  Depreciation rate of physical capital 0.1177
 Elastiticity of human capital wrt prod. government expenditures 0.12
  Elasticity of human capital wrt education time 0.3
  Discount factor 0.9423
"j Age-productivity profile by age j exp(0.05age  0.0006age2)
Tj,L Costs related to working - low (age 1 to 4; age 5 to 14) 0.004, 0.0035
Tj,M Costs related to working - medium (age 1 to 4; age 5 to 15) 0.003, 0.002
Tj,H Costs related to working - high 0
⌫s Shares of ability types in population 0.33
⌘H , ⌘M , ⌘L Input shares of high, middle and low ability individuals ⌘H = 0.417, ⌘M = 0.328, ⌘L = 0.256
 H , M E ciency parameters in human capital production function  H = 0.626, M = 0.121
µ Union markup above the union reference wage 17%
q1, q2, q3 Weights used in the determination of the union reference wage 0.8, 0.05, 0.15
✓M , ✓L Relative human capital inheritance parameters ✓M = 0.826, ✓L = 0.653
 j Preference for leisure  1=0.8208  9=0.1052
 2=0.2855  10=0.1162
 3= 0.1100  11=0.1265
 4=0.0769  12=0.1545
 5=0.1273  13=0.2644
 6=0.1194  14=0.3215
 7=0.1124  15=0.6563
 8=0.1094
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5 Empirical relevance
To investigate the empirical relevance of our calibrated model, we introduce time series for
the exogenous variables and check how well model simulations replicate the data for the most
important endogenous variables. The exogenous variables concern demography (fertility and
survival rates), the world real interest rate, the rate of technical progress, and a set of fiscal
and pension policy parameters. We discuss them in Section 5.1. We compare the model’s fitted
values to the data for the old-age dependency ratio, per capita GDP growth, aggregate average
per capita hours worked, the capital-output ratio, and the Gini coe cient since the 1950s or
1960s in Section 5.2. We do the same for per capita hours worked in di↵erent age groups and
di↵erent ability (or education) groups, and for participation in higher education in shorter time
periods.
5.1 Exogenous variables
Figure 5 shows the evolution over time of conditional survival rates, srtj , for individuals born in
1905, 1925, 1950, 1975 and 2014. We observe an overall rise, with higher probabilities to survive
at higher age, for people born later. The increase is particularly strong at ages 75 and 90. As a
result, and as we also mentioned in the introduction to this paper, a child born in Belgium can
now (unconditionally) expect to reach age 90 with a probability of more than 60%. For a child
born in 1950 that probability was less than 30%. Figure 6 shows the fertility rate ft as defined
in Equation 1. We see a peak in 1963-65 and 1966-68, when the after-war babyboomers became
18. Both periods reveal a growth rate of the youngest generation by almost 20% compared to
the previous period. After a few more periods with ft > 1 in the 1970s, we observe a decline of
the youngest cohort (ft < 1) in the 1980s and 1990s. Later decades show a pattern of dampened
oscillation.
Figure 5: Age-specific conditional
survival rates in Belgium
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Figure 6: Model fertility rate since 1951
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Data source: see Figures 1 and 2. Computational details are provided in Appendix D.
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The assumption of an open economy with perfect capital mobility implies that the net after-tax
rate of return on physical capital will always be equal to the (exogenous) world real interest rate
rt. It requires us to introduce data for this interest rate over a very long period of time. To the
best of our knowledge, however, this is not readily available. Krueger and Ludwig (2007) and
- more recently - Marchiori et al. (2017) have computed highly relevant series using an OLG
model and taking into account projections for future demography at the world or OECD level.
Their results are fairly similar, but their data do not cover the whole period since 1950. To get
data also for the earliest decades, we relied on the US stock market data from Shiller (2015).
Figure 7 includes his cyclically-adjusted earnings/price ratio in %. We take it as a proxy for
the return to physical capital in the world in the 20th century. Combining this proxy with the
simulated real interest rate series for 2000-2050 from Marchiori et al. (2017), and smoothing
using a third degree polynomial, yields our world real interest rate.
Figure 8 displays the exogenous rate of labour augmenting technical change gat since 1951.
Our main source is Feenstra et al. (2015, Penn World Table 8.1). We used their data for TFP
growth until 2011, after a double adjustment. First, a correction was necessary for the di↵erent
treatment of hours worked7. Second, we HP-filtered the corrected data to obtain the trend rate
of technical change and to exclude cyclical e↵ects. From 2014 to 2021, we approximate gat by
productivity per hour worked as projected by the Federal Planning Bureau (2016). Missing data
in between both periods are determined by lineair interpolation. As of 2022, we use productivity
per worker as advanced by the Belgian Studiecommissie voor de Vergrijzing (2016) as a proxy.
The projected 1.5% annual growth rate after 2034 also corresponds to the projection for the
rate of technical progress of the 2015 European Commission’s Working Group on Ageing.
Figure 7: Annual world interest rate
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Figure 8: Average annual rate of technical progress
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7The Penn World Table 8.1 includes data for TFP (rtfpna) which correspond to the following production function:
Y = BK↵ (hc.L)1 ↵, with B the level of TFP, K physical capital, hc human capital and L employment (in
persons). Using comparable notation, our production function would be Y = K↵ (A.hc.L.h)1 ↵ with h hours
worked per employed person. It then follows that B = (A.h)1 ↵. The relevant growth rate of A in our model
can then be approximated as the growth rate of B (or rtfpna in PWT) divided by the labour share (1 ↵) minus
the growth rate of hours worked per employed person.
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Figure 9: Fiscal and pension policy variables
(a) Labour and consumption tax rates in %
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Data sources and computation: see Appendix D.
Note: (1) Earlier data are assumed to be equal to their level in the earliest available year.
The evolution over time of the fiscal and pension policy variables in our model is shown in figure
9. In appendix D, more detail is provided on the underlying data sources and computations.
We also include the evolution of the public debt to GDP ratio in Figure 9f. We determined
the lump sum transfer Zt in Equation 36 such that our simulated model exactly replicates this
evolution. Other policy variables are the pension weights pj with i = 1 15 for the medium and
high ability group and j = 1  14 for the low ability group. In correspondence with the Belgian
public pension system which imposes equal weights, we set them all to 1/15 and 1/14 respectively.
For the computation of the public pension of low skilled workers, periods of unemployment are
considered equivalent to periods of work, also in correspondence with the system in Belgium.
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The weights puj in Equation 30b are therefore set equal to pj or also 1/14. Both the revaluation
factor applied to past labour income in the determination of the pension benefit of new retirees
wg, and the revaluation factor applied to adapt pension benefits of existing retirees to increased
living standards pg follow the Belgian reality8. The contribution rates of individuals and firms
to the first pillar pension scheme cr1 and cr2 are 7.5% and 8.9% respectively (OECD Pensions
at a Glance, 2013). The contribution rates to the second pillar pension fund of employees and
employers pf1 and pf2 are 0% and 1.35% respectively (FSMA, 2011, p11).
5.2 Backfitting
Figure 10a shows the evolution of the growth rate of per capita potential GDP over 1951-2016.
The values displayed show for every period of three years (starting in the year indicated on
the horizontal axis) what the average annual growth rate is. Although the model series is
more volatile than the data due to the assumption of perfect capital mobility, it captures the
trend observed over a very long time period. Figure 10b displays average annual per capita hours
worked averaged over all ages and ability types during 1960-2014. The reported model prediction
follows from the simulated fractions of time that individuals work (n) and our assumption that
potential annual hours are 2080 (see also Appendix C).The evolution predicted by the model is
in strong accordance with the evolution observed in the data.
Figure 10
(a) Average annual growth rate of potential GDP
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Data sources: Figure 10a: EU Commission, AMECO, series OVGDP and population, datapoints before 1960 are averages
over three years of real GDP per capita data provided by the Penn World Table (8.1, series rgdpna, Feenstra et al., 2015).
Figure 10b: OECD, 2015, Annual Labour Force Statistics; The Conference Board Total Economy Database, 2015.
Figure 11a shows how per capita hours vary by age in 2005-2007. Figures 11b-11d break this
variable down in its constituting parts: hours worked by respectively the high, medium and low
ability group. Although not perfect, the match between simulated and true data is very good.
8In Belgium, only labour income earned between 1955 and 1974 underwent real revaluations according to wgn
with n = 1 in 1974, n = 2 in 1973, ..., n = 20 in 1955 and wg = 1.036 in 1974-1996, wg = 1.032 in 1997,
wg = 1.028 in 1998, ..., wg = 1 as of 2005 (Festjens, 1997). pg is set to 1 before 1969, 1.023 annually between
1969 and 1992, 0.993 between 1993 and 2013, 1.003 for 2014-15, 1.005 for 2016-21 and 1.002 afterwards. Data
before 1984 are from Festjens (1997). Observations until 2015 and future values were taken from Studiecommissie
voor de Vergrijzing (2016).
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Figure 11: Annual per capita hours worked by age and ability in 2005-2007
(a) Per capita hours worked by age
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(b) Per capita hours worked: high
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(c) Per capita hours worked: medium
0
300
600
900
1,200
1,500
18
-2
0 
21
-2
3 
24
-2
6 
27
-2
9 
30
-3
2 
33
-3
5 
36
-3
8 
39
-4
1 
42
-4
4 
45
-4
7 
48
-5
0 
51
-5
3 
54
-5
6 
57
-5
9 
60
-6
2 
Data Model
(d) Per capita hours worked: low
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Note: in Appendix C we provide more details about the computation of annual per capita hours worked. Underlying data
sources: Eurostat, Employment rates by sex, age and education (lfsa ergaed) and Average usual weekly hours of work by
professional status (lfsq ewhuis); OECD, Labour Force Statistics, Average usual weekly hours worked on the main job.
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Figure 12
(a) Average education rate of the
high ability group (age 18 to 29)
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Data sources: Figure 12a: Enrollment rate: World Bank, World Development Indicators; Barro and Lee (2013). Fraction
with tertiary degree: Eurostat, Population by educational attainment. Figure 12b: Feenstra et al. (2015): series rgdpna
and rkna. Figure 12c: Gini coe cient of market income: Solt (2014), Figure 12d: the population of 65 or more divided by
the population of 18 to 64: Population forecasts 2015-2060 of the Belgian Federal Planning Bureau and Statistics Belgium.
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The use of a di↵erent scale makes a direct comparison of the data for investment in education
with the education rate (e) in our model impossible. Indirectly, one can see however in Figure
12a the same upward trend over time, and even the slight acceleration in the major part of
the 1990s. The capital-output ratio implied by the production function (cf. Eq. 20), for given
values of the real interest rate, the capital share in production, the depreciation rate of physical
capital and the capital tax rates is shown in Figure 12b. Figure 12c compares the values of the
pre-tax Gini coe cient generated by the model with the data9. Pre-tax income includes labour
income, unemployment benefits, interest income, pensions and lump-sum transfers. We consider
the unemployed members of a low ability household as a separate group. The most important
thing to note is the fairly identical stability over time in the data and in our simulated Gini.
Last but not least, the old-age dependency ratio in our model matches very strongly the actual
data in 12d.
6 Macroeconomic e↵ects of demographic change
Having demonstrated the capacity of our calibrated model to replicate the level and evolution
of key data in Belgium in 1960-2014, we now use the model to assess the e↵ects of demographic
changes on a wide range of endogenous macroeconomic variables. The changes we consider
are the increase in life expectancy (increasing survival rates) and the evolution of the size
of the youngest cohort induced by changing fertility, as we have shown in Figures 5 and 6.
Together, they imply a strong increase in the ratio of non-active to active people in Figure 1,
most dramatically so in 2010-2040.
Figure 13: Per capita output and growth e↵ects of demographic change
(a) Average annual per capita growth rate
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The baseline simulation in Figure 13a shows our prediction for per capita economic growth until
2061 if these projections for demographic change become true, and if fiscal and pension policy
parameters are kept constant (mostly at the level of 2014). Another underlying assumption is
that the future world real interest rate and the rate of technical progress manifest themselves as
shown in Figures 7 and 8. The alternative ’no demographic change’ scenario counterfactually
assumes that (i) the fertility rate (i.e. the growth rate of the cohort of age 18 to 20) remains
constant at its 1948-50 level, and (ii) the unconditional probability to survive is constant at
9We computed the model Gini using Cowell’s (2011) lower-bound index GL.
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the value that holds for the youngest cohort of 1948-50. As such, the ’no demographic change’
scenario imposes a constant instead of an increasing life expectancy for generations entering our
model in 1948 or later. Another assumption (iii) concerns the projected evolution of the exoge-
nous world interest rate. Existing literature is unanimous in its expectation that demographic
change induces a lower world real interest rate. The majority of existing studies advances a
reduction in the interest rate due to demographic change of about 0.5 to 1%-point by 2025 (see
e.g. Krueger and Ludwig, 2007; Ludwig et al., 2012; Marchiori et al., 2017; Attanasio et al.,
2016). Among these studies, Ludwig et al. (2012) project the smallest decline. The reason is
their assumption of endogenous human capital and the positive e↵ect of demographic change on
human capital accumulation. Only Attanasio et al. (2016) predict a decline of the interest rate
that exceeds 1.5%-points. Building on these existing studies, and taking into account that also
in our model human capital is endogenous, we impose in our ’no demographic change’ counter-
factual an interest rate that exceeds the baseline level by 0.5%-points from 2020 onwards. The
higher interest rate gap arises gradually, starting from 1993 onwards10,11.
The di↵erent panels in Figure 14 reveal the implications of the ’no demographic change’
assumption for various indicators of the size and the distribution of the population when both
underlying components of this assumption are imposed, as well as when only one of them is
imposed (and actual data are used for the other one). As one of the main (expected) counterfac-
tual results, we observe in panel c under the ’no demographic change’ scenario a constant ratio
of the population at working age to total population, from about 2010 onwards. Unsurprisingly,
the same holds for the old-age dependency ratio in panel b.
10The results that we report further in this section are quite robust. Raising the assumed interest rate increase
in the ’no demographic change’ counterfactual a↵ects our future growth predictions only marginally. If we
alternatively assume a closed economy where the interest rate adjusts to establish capital market equilibrium,
we also find that demographic change leads to a lower interest rate. The di↵erence arises in the mid 1990s, to
become 0.89%-points by 2020.
11While the literature is unanimous in projecting lower real interest rates due to demographic change, there is no
such an agreement regarding the e↵ect of demographic change and ageing on technical progress and the growth
rate of TFP. Some find a negative impact (e.g. Aiyar et al., 2016), others expect positive e↵ects (e.g Acemoglu
and Restrepo, 2017). In our ’no demographic change’ counterfactuals we stay in the middle. We assume no
change in the imposed future growth rate of technical progress and maintain the projection of Figure 8.
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Figure 14: Demographic change: e↵ects on the population and its distribution
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Arithmetically, i.e. disregarding behavioural adjustments, we found in Section 2 that projected
demographic change may cut o↵ about 0.4%-points of the annual per capita growth rate in
the next 25 years. Accounting now for behavioural adjustment, Figure 13a reveals an average
per capita growth gap due to demographic change of only 0.29%-points in 2017-2040. Figure
13b reveals, however, that by 2035 lost per capita output will still amount to more than 10%
of its level in 2008. The fact that the projected fall in the per capita growth rate is clearly
smaller than 0.4%-points, indicates significant favourable behavioural e↵ects of demographic
change. However, these e↵ects are not strong enough. The di↵erent panels of Figures 15 and
17 provide more insight. Anticipating, we find that falling fertility and (especially) increasing
life expectancy do cause important favourable behavioural adjustments, with the capacity to
counteract unfortunate arithmetical e↵ects. For two reasons, however, we do not see these
fully translated into our per capita growth projections. First, many of the adjustments have
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already taken place in previous decades. Second, increased household savings do not a↵ect
future domestic output due to capital outflow in an open economy.
d
Figure 15: Components of per capita growth in the baseline simulation and under constant demography
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Figure 15 returns to the decomposition of per capita output growth that we presented at
the beginning of Section 2. Behavioural adjustment should show up either in changes in labour
productivity growth (Figure 16a), for example due to changes in investment in physical or human
capital, or in changes in the growth rate of hours worked per person at working age (Figure 16b).
Comparing our baseline simulation for both growth rates with their counterfactual under the
assumption of no demographic change, we see that counterfactual growth has almost always
been lower since the 1980s. Demographic change thus implied higher productivity growth and
increasing hours worked. Since the 2000s, however, the di↵erence has become smaller.
Figure 17 focuses on the behavioural responses themselves. We show our baseline simulations
and three counterfactuals for hours worked, education (by those of high ability), gross investment
in physical capital and savings (as captured by the accumulated stock of nonhuman wealth).
We also include our results for the current account and for public pension expenditures in % of
GDP12.
12Note that when we run the counterfactual simulations in which one demographic variable is kept constant, while
the other is allowed to change, we also adjust the assumed world interest rate. As we have mentioned before,
following Ludwig et al. (2012), it has been our assumption that demographic change induces a drop in the world
interest rate of 0.5%-points in the long run. If only one demographic variable changes, however, this interest
rate drop will be smaller, and its evolution over time will be di↵erent. While the increase in life expectancy in
the world has been gradual, and is expected to continue even beyond 2050, the trend decline in fertility in the
20th century was interrupted by the baby boom in developed countries. Moreover, it is expected to stabilize
sooner than 2050 (Attanasio et al., 2016). Our counterfactual interest rate projections, obtained via a closed
economy version of our model where the interest rate establishes capital market equilibrium, reflect this. Details
are available upon simple request. Our conclusions are not a↵ected by the precise allocation of the 0.5%-points
interest rate change to either fertility or life expectancy
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Figure 17: Demographic change: macroeconomic e↵ects
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If we first compare the level and evolution of the full black line in the di↵erent panels of
Figure 17 (baseline simulation) with the interrupted black line (no demographic change), our
main findings are the following. Demographic change induces an increase in labour supply
and per capita hours worked, an increase in schooling, an increase in savings and the stock of
non-human wealth, but lower gross investment, and much higher future pension expenditures.
Related to the changes in savings and investment, the current account improves (and capital
flows out).
Figure 17b shows that the increased participation in higher education is mainly due to longer
life expectancy. An overall increase in survival rates encourages individuals to study since it
allows individuals to enjoy the returns on their investment during a (much) longer period.
Increased returns will include higher labour income before the normal retirement age (which
individuals will be more likely to reach) as well as higher pensions after it (which individuals
will enjoy for a longer period of time). For the latter e↵ect to materialize, however, it is important
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that pensions are related to the individual’s own labour income and education (see the first order
condition in Appendix B).
The increase in human capital and its positive e↵ect on the wage is one element making it
attractive for individuals to work more. Another one is the perspective of longer life (including
longer life in retirement for a given pension age), which implies the need for more resources
at old age to maintain consumption standards. These e↵ects will ultimately lead to increased
average annual hours worked in Figure 17a. Note that during 1993-2008 higher average annual
hours worked are primarily caused by the variable fertility rate that led to a lower population
at working age. Last but not least, labour supply will be encouraged most if increased hours of
work also feed through into higher future pensions (see again Appendix B).
Next to making individuals work more, the need for more resources will also make them
save more and accumulate more financial assets (and consume less when young). The dominant
positive impact of increasing life expectancy on savings, is most clear in Figure 17d. This result
supports the hypothesis that its positive e↵ect on savings (due the fact that people at active
age and young retirees will save more) dominates its negative e↵ect (arising from the growing
number of dissavers).
The fact that individuals raise labour supply, and accumulate more human capital, are two
drivers that could encourage firms to invest in physical capital since both drivers raise the
marginal productivity of physical capital (in line with equation 29). Figure 17c confirms this.
Investment would be the highest (until about 2032) if the fertility rate was kept constant at
its level of 1948-50, but life expectancy was free to vary as it did in reality. The reason for
the drastic reduction of investment in the baseline simulation is clear then. It follows from the
drop in the population at working age (see also Figure 14e). Although individuals optimally
raise their labour supply, aggregate labour input will fall due the lower number of people. The
negative e↵ect of this fall on the need for equipment and the productivity of physical capital is
an important cause of capital outflow (an improvement of the current account and a reduction
of net capital inflow, see Figure 17f) and disinvestment.
The strong increase in the old-age dependency ratio (Figure 14b) due to subsequent relatively
smaller youngest cohorts and increasing life expectancy translates in fast growing public pension
expenditures from 2014 onwards. Over 2014-61 demographic change induces public pension
expenditures to be on average 1.6% of GDP higher compared with the constant fertility and life
expectancy scenario. The maximum increase is about 2% of GDP in the early and mid 2030s.
Figure 17e reveals that the main cause up until 2032 is the path of fertility experienced in the
past. Later, increased life expectancy is becoming more important.
The results that we showed in Figure 17 are macroeconomic results. To further substantiate
our conclusions on the behavioural e↵ects of demographic change, we include in Appendix E the
results of counterfactual simulations at the level of separate cohorts (generations) of individuals
over time. We distinguish cohorts that entered the model at age 18 in 1966, 1981, 1996 and
2011. We observe for most cohorts indeed higher hours worked, increased savings, and increased
time allocated to education when young.
We have tested the robustness of our results in Figures 13, 15 and 17 to variation in the projected
future world real interest rate and future technical change (TFP growth). To be more specific,
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we simulated and compared new baselines and new ’no demographic change’ counterfactuals,
respectively assuming a higher world real interest rate (0.5%-points higher by 2030) and a lower
rate of technical change (0.5%-points lower by 2035). The levels of all endogenous variables
obviously change, but also under these alternative projections the net per capita growth e↵ect
of demographic change is very close to -0.30%-points, while the increase in pension expenditures
remains about 1.6% of GDP. Also under these alternative projections, individuals increase their
participation in higher education, work more and save more due to demographic change. Capital
will again flow out and private investment will be lower.
7 Conclusion
Demographic change, characterized by an increasing life expectancy, decreased fertility rates
and the retirement of the baby boom generation, constitutes a major challenge to most OECD
economies, including Belgium. In this paper we construct and parameterize a large-scale 28
period OLG model for an open economy to quantitatively assess the e↵ects of this demographic
challenge. Individuals in the model do not only di↵er by age, but also by innate ability. Another
strength of the model is the endogeneity of a wide range of variables including hours worked and
employment by age and ability, unemployment among individuals with low ability and skills,
human capital and per capita output, the public budget, and inequality in income.
After calibration the model replicates the fundamental evolution of key macroeconomic vari-
ables in Belgium in the previous decades quite well. This observation raises confidence that the
model may produce a reliable projection of fundamental macroeconomic developments in the
future. Assuming unchanged policies, our predictions are not optimistic. Demographic change
may cause a significant drag on per capita growth, of on average almost 0.3%-points annually
for the next 25 years. It also implies an increase in public pension expenditures by on aver-
age almost 1.6% of GDP annually. An important factor is the negative e↵ect of lower fertility
and the resulting fall in the population at working age on the return to investment in physi-
cal capital. The induced positive behavioural e↵ects from demographic change on individual
labour supply and schooling can only partially counteract this drop in the size of the labour
force. Some of these positive behavioural e↵ects have already taken place in previous decades.
Moreover, rather than promoting domestic investment, the increased savings, to which longer
life expectancy contributes, may to an important extent flow out of the country.
Considering our expectation of a long-run slowdown in per capita growth due to demographic
change, our paper tends to match with the supply-side view in the recent secular stagnation
literature, as expressed by among others Gordon (2014) and Cervellati et al. (2017).
To counter (very) poor per capita growth in the next two decades, policy changes promoting
employment and productivity will be necessary. In Belgium there still is an enormous poten-
tial to raise hours worked per capita as they are currently far below the level in most other
OECD countries. Policy changes (pension reform, tax shift, etc.) aimed at reducing the high
unemployment rate among the low educated and at increasing the low amount of hours worked
among older workers are paramount. Policy should also be directed towards stimulating labour
productivity growth, which has been lower than the EU average for almost two decades.
In future work, we will use our calibrated model to analyse the e ciency of policies aimed
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at coping with the e↵ects of demographic change by means of (parametric and non-parametric)
pension reform.
References
Acemoglu, D. and Restrepo, S. (2017). Secular stagnation? The e↵ect of aging on economic
growth. NBER Working Paper. N  23077.
Aiyar, S., Ebeke, C., and Shao, X. (2016). The impact of workforce aging on european produc-
tivity. IMF Working Paper Series. N  16/238.
Andolfatto, D. (1996). Business cycles and labor-market search. The American Economic
Review, 86:112–132.
Annabi, N., Harvey, S., and Lan, Y. (2011). Public expenditures on education, human capital
and growth in canada: An olg model analysis. Journal of Policy Modelling, 33:852–865.
Attanasio, O., Bonfatti, A., Kitao, S., and Weber, G. (2016). Global demographic trends:
consumption, saving and international capital flows. In Piggott, J. and Woodland, A., editors,
Handbook of the Economics of Population Aging, pages 179–235. Elsevier North-Holland.
Barro, R. (1990). Government spending in a simple model of endogenous growth. Journal of
Political Economy, 98:103–125.
Barro, R. and Lee, J. (2013). A new data set of educational attainment in the world, 1950-2010.
Journal of Development Economics, 104:184–198.
Ben-Porath, Y. (1967). The production of human capital and the life-cycle of earnings. Journal
of Political Economy, 75:352–365.
Blankenau, W. and Simpson, N. (2004). Public education expenditures and growth. Journal of
Development Economics, 73:583–605.
Blankenau, W., Simpson, N., and Osborn, D. (2007). Public education expenditures, taxation,
and growth: Linking data to theory. American Economic Review, 97:393–397.
Bloom, E., Canning, D., Mansfield, R., and Moore, M. (2007). Demographic change, social
security systems and savings. Journal of Monetary Economics, 54:92–114.
Boone, B. and Heylen, F. (2015). Cross-country di↵erences in unemployment: fiscal policy,
unions and households preferences in general equilibrium. Faculty of Economics and Business
Administration Working Paper. Ghent University. N  899.
Bouzahzah, M., de la Croix, D., and Docquier, F. (2002). Policy reforms and growth in compu-
tational olg economies. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 19:2093–2113.
Buyse, T., Heylen, F., and Van de Kerckhove, R. (2017). Pension reform in an OLG model with
heterogeneous abilities. Journal of Pension Economics and Finance, 16:144–172.
Cantillon, B., Peeters, J., and Ridder, E. D. (1987). Atlas van de Sociale Zekerheid. Acco.
35
Card, D. and Krueger, A. (1992). Does school quality matter? returns to education and the
characteristics of public schools in the united states. Journal of Political Economy, 100:1–40.
Caselli, F. and Coleman, W. (2006). The world technology frontier. American Economic Review,
96:499–522.
Cervellati, M. and Sunde, U. (2013). Life expectancy, schooling, and lifetime labor supply:
theory and evidence revisited. Econometrica, 81:2055–2086.
Cervellati, M., Sunde, U., and Zimmermann, K. (2017). Demographic dynamics and long-run
development: insights for the secular stagnation debate. Journal of Population Economics,
30:401–432.
Coleman, J., Campbell, E., Hobson, C., McPartland, J., Mood, A., Weinfeld, F., and York, R.
(1996). Equality of educational opportunity. U.S. Government Printing O ce.
Courne`de, B. and Gonand, F. (2006). Restoring fiscal sustainability in the euro area: raise taxes
or curb spending. OECD Economics Department Working Papers. N  270.
Cowell, F. (2011). Measuring Inequality. Oxford University Press.
de la Croix, D., Pierrard, O., and Sneessens, H. (2013). Aging and pensions in general equi-
librium: Labor market imperfections matter. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control,
37:104–124.
Dedry, A., Onder, H., and Pestieau, P. (2016). Aging, social security design, and capital accu-
mulation. CESifo Working Paper. N  5979.
Devereux, M., Gri th, R., and Klemm, A. (2002). Corporate income tax reforms and interna-
tional tax competition. Economic Policy, 35:451–495.
Docquier, F. and Paddison, O. (2003). Social security benefit rules, growth, and inequality.
Journal of Macroeconomics, 25:47–71.
Ebbinghaus, B. and Gronwald, M. (2009). International policy di↵usion or path dependent
adaptation? The changing public-private pension mix in europe. In Ebbinghaus, B., editor,
Varieties of Pension Governance. The Privatization of Pensions in Europe. Oxford Univ.
Press. 2011.
Federal Planning Bureau (2016). Economische vooruitzichten 2016-21.
Feenstra, R. C., Inklaar, R., and Timmer, M. P. (2015). The next generation of the Penn
World Table. American Economic Review, 105(10):3150–3182. Available for download at
http://www.ggdc.net/pwt.
Festjens, M. (1997). De pensioenhervorming. Een nieuwe generatie en een nieuw contract. Federal
Planning Bureau Planning Paper. N  82.
Fouge`re, M., Harvey, S., Mercenier, J., and Me´rette, M. (2009). Population ageing, time allo-
cation and human capital: a general equilibrium analysis for canada. Economic Modelling,
26:30–39.
36
Goodhart, C. and Erfurth, P. (2014). Demography and economics: Look past the past.
VoxEU.org. 4 November.
Gordon, R. J. (2014). The turtle’s progress: Secular stagnation meets the headwinds. In
Teulings, C. and Baldwin, R., editors, Secular Stagnation: Facts, Causes and Cures, pages
47–59. CEPR Press and VoxEU.org, London.
Guo, J. and Lansing, K. (1998). Indeterminacy and stabilization policy. Journal of Economic
Theory, 82:482–490.
Heijdra, B. J. and Reijnders, L. S. (2017). Longevity shocks with age-dependent productivity
growth. Journal of Pension Economics and Finance. forthcoming.
Heylen, F. and Van de Kerckhove, R. (2013). Employment by age, education, and economic
growth: e↵ects of fiscal policy composition in general equilibrium. The B.E. Journal of
Macroeconomics, 13:49–103.
IMF (2014). Perspectives on global real interest rates. World Economic Outlook. April, chapter
3.
Koyuncu, M. (2016). Can progressive taxation account for cross-country variation in labor
supply. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 35:1474–1488.
Krueger, D. and Ludwig, A. (2007). On the consequences of demographic change for rates of
returns to capital, and the distribution of wealth and welfare. Journal of Monetary Economics,
54:49–87.
Lee, R. (2016). Macroeconomics, aging and growth. In Piggott, J. and Woodland, A., editors,
Handbook of the Economics of Population Aging, pages 59–118. Elsevier North-Holland.
Lucas, R. (1990). Supply-side economics: an analytical review. Oxford Economic Papers,
42:292–316.
Ludwig, A., Schelkle, T., and Vogel, E. (2011). Online appendix to ”demographic change, human
capital and welfare”. Review of Economic Dynamics. Technical Appendices 08-168.
Ludwig, A., Schelkle, T., and Vogel, E. (2012). Demographic change, human capital and welfare.
Review of Economic Dynamics, 15:94–107.
Marchiori, L., Pierrard, O., and Sneessens, H. (2017). The EU-US unemployment puzzle re-
visited: institutions, demography, and capital flows. Journal of Demographic Economics,
83:259–305.
McDaniel, C. (2007). Average tax rates on consumption, investment, labor
and capital in the oecd 1950-2003. Arizona State University. Updated 2014
(http://www.caramcdaniel.com/researchpapers).
Me´rette, M. and Georges, P. (2009). Demographic changes and the gains from globalisation: an
overlapping generations CGE analysis. Department of Economics Working Paper. University
of Ottawa. N  0903E.
37
Merz, M. (1995). Search in the labor market and the real business cycle. Journal of Monetary
Economics, 36:269–300.
Miles, D. (1999). Modelling the impact of demographic change upon the economy. The Economic
Journal, 109:1–36.
OECD (2015). Statistical annex. Employment Outlook. Paris.
Onder, H. and Pestieau, P. (2014). Is aging bad for the economy? Maybe. Economic Premise,
144. The World Bank.
Rogerson, R. (2007). Taxation and market work: is Scandinavia an outlier? Economic Theory,
32:59–85.
Rogerson, R. and Wallenius, J. (2009). Micro and macro elasticities in a life cycle model with
taxes. Journal of Economic Theory, 144:2277–2292.
Sa´nchez-Romero, M. (2013). The role of demography on per capita output growth and savings
rates. Journal of Population Economics, 26:1347–1377.
Scruggs, L. (2007). Investigating welfare state change. In Clasen, J. and Siegel, N. A., editors,
Welfare state generosity across space and time, pages 133–165. Edward Elgar.
Shiller, R. (2015). Irrational Exuberance. Princeton University Press, Third edition, online data.
(http://www.econ.yale.edu/ shiller/data.htm).
Solt, F. (2014). The standardized world income inequality database. Social Science Quarterly.
Forthcoming, http://myweb.uiowa.edu/fsolt/swiid/swiid.html.
Studiecommissie voor de Vergrijzing (2016). Jaarlijks verslag 2016.
Tomas, C. (2008). Search and matching frictions and optimal monetary policy. Journal of
Monetary Economics, 55:936–956.
38
Appendices
A Calibration results: model output as a fraction of the cali-
bration targets during 1996-2007 (in %)
Variable Model output / Data Variable Model output / Data
n1 89.4 n11 98.3
n2 94.4 n12 98.3
n3 95.4 n13 98.3
n4 95.8 n14 98.3
n5 98.0 n15 1.00
n6 98.0 eM 94.2
n7 98.1 eH 128.7
n8 98.1 rwLH 104.7
n9 98.2 rwLM 103.3
n10 98.3 u 97.8
Mean Squared Error = 0.0014924
Notes: nj denotes annual hours worked per individual of age j averaged over all ability groups, es for
s =M,H denotes the average education rate (cf. Appendix C.2) of all individuals of ability type s in the
age category 18-29, rwLH and rwLM stand for the relative pre-tax wage of a low ability individual versus
a high ability individual and a medium ability individual respectively, u denotes the unemployment rate.
The values displayed are the averages of model output as a fraction of the averages of real data (i.e. the
calibration targets) during 1996-2007.
B First-order conditions of households
The law of motion of optimal consumption over time is denoted by Euler-equation 53a. Adding
exogenous survival rates (< 1) to the model implies, compared to the standard result, that
individuals will prefer to consume more now and less later. This is easy to understand as they
now face a (known) probability to be dead in the next period. Another result is that, assuming
conditional survival rates drop when an individual ages, the consumption path becomes flatter
and turns negative when the conditional survival rate is lower than 1/ (  (1 + rt)). Increased
life expectancy, modelled as rising survival rates, will postpone this turning point. Furthermore,
it is important to note that due to the implementation of liquidity constraints for low ability
individuals, they aren’t necessarily able to choose their optimal consumption plan. In practice
a minimum function will determine whether consumption can be optimal or not by comparing
for every period the optimal level to the level that follows from a budget constraint with zero
end-of-period assets.
ctJ+1,s (1 + ⌧c)
ctJ,s (1 + ⌧c)
=  srtJ (1 + rt+J) (53a)
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The optimal labour-leisure choice for medium and high ability households is described by Equa-
tion 54. Low ability households face exactly the same choice, although they retire sooner. In
each period, individuals will supply labour up to the point where (discounted) marginal utility
of leisure equals that of labour. The latter is elaborated on the right-hand side. Working one
more hour in the considered period yields more resources to consume and more utility in that
period itself (first term RHS), but also when retired (second and third term RHS). The gain
from work in the period itself will rise when the wage, the productivity level, the probability to
survive and the human capital stock are higher and when the initial consumption level, the tax
levels on labour and consumption, the transport and child care costs and the contribution rate
to the second pillar pension are lower. The second term captures the extra consumption possi-
bilities resulting from working more during period J in the first period of retirement (model-age
16), the third term the extra consumption possibilities in all other years of retirement. These
consumption possibilities depend, next to those already mentioned, positively on the earnings-
linked replacement rate, rrs, the period J-weight related to period net labour income, pJ , the
contribution rates of both individuals and firms to the second pillar pension fund pf1 and pf2,
the real interest rate r, the revaluation measure applied to past labour income, wg and the
pension revaluation factor pg. The di↵erence between the second and third term is that in the
second term only the first period of retirement is captured. In that year the individual receives
not only the regular pension payment but also capital plus accrued interest out of the second
pillar pension fund. If we were using annuities for pension payments out of the second pillar
fund, then the second and third term would coincide.
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Equation 55 states that the marginal utility loss from investing in education in period J for
s = M,H must equal the (discounted) marginal utility gain over life. The LHS makes clear
that spending time in education is not rewarded in the same period: one loses leisure time. In
return, however, this investment will yield extra consumption possibilities in later periods. Due
to the rise in human capital, working will be rewarded more due to increased productivity and
consequently labour income. This increase in labour income will -ceteris paribus- also translate
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in a higher first and second pillar pension.
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C Employment and education rates
C.1 Annual hours worked per capita
For each ability group annual hours worked per capita are computed as the employment rate
in persons multiplied by annual hours worked per employed person. In the description of the
model in Section 3, the supply of labour hours is expressed as a fraction of potential hours. This
fraction is denoted by ntj,s. Our proxy for potential hours per person is 40 hours per week during
52 weeks per year. For individuals of high and medium ability ntj,s will also be the fraction of
hours actually worked. For individuals of low ability, who can be unemployed, the fraction of
hours worked is ntj,L(1   ut). Reported hours will be higher if a larger fraction of those in an
age or skill group are employed, and if those employed work more hours. We report the data by
age and ability averaged over 1996-2007 in figure C.1.
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Data sources and computation:
Employment rate in persons by age and ability (education): As proxy for the high ability group,
we use data for individuals with a tertiary degree. The representative individual of medium
ability will have a higher secondary degree, but no tertiary degree. The representative lower
ability individual will obtain a lower secondary degree at best. EUROSTAT, Employment rates
by sex, age and highest level of education attained, lfsa ergaed. Figure C.2
Hours worked per week by age and ability : ILO (2012, International standard classification
of occupations, structure, group definitions and correspondence tables) links professions catego-
rized in ISCO-08 groups to ISCED-97 levels of education. As the low ability group corresponds
to ISCED-97 groups 1 to 2 (primary and lower secondary education), the medium group to
groups 3 and 4 (upper secondary or post-secondary, non-tertiary education), and the high abil-
ity group to ISCED-97 groups 5 and 6 (tertiary education), the professions of low, medium
and high ability are composed as follows: Low ability individuals can be found among clerical
support workers, service and sales workers, craft and related trades workers, plant and machine
operators and assemblers, workers in elementary occupations). Medium ability workers can be
found in the same occupations, but not in elementary occupations. We expect high ability in-
dividuals to be ISCO-08 technicians and associate professionals, professionals, and managers.
Data on hours worked per week by age stem from OECD Stat (Labour Force Statistics, Average
usual weekly hours worked on the main job). EUROSTAT provides the data on hours worked
per week by profession (Average number of usual weekly hours of work in the main job, by
sex, professional status, full- time/part-time and occupation, lfsq ewhuis). The data concern
dependent employees. Figure C.4.
Average number of weeks worked per year : average annual hours actually worked per worker
(dependent employment) divided by average usual weekly hours worked on the main job by all
workers (dependent employment). OECD Stat, Labour Force Statistics, Hours worked.
Labour supply in persons among the low ability group: EUROSTAT (Activity rates by sex,
age and highest level of education attained, lfsa argaed).
Unemployment rate among the low educated : EUROSTAT (Unemployment rates by sex, age
and educational attainment, lfsa urgaed). Figure C.3.
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Figure C.1: Annual per capita hours worked by ability (education) and age (averaged over 1996-2007)
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
18
-20
 
21
-23
 
24
-26
 
27
-29
 
30
-32
 
33
-35
 
36
-38
 
39
-41
 
42
-44
 
45
-47
 
48
-50
 
51
-53
 
54
-56
 
57
-59
 
60
-62
 
High Medium Low
Figure C.2: Employment rate in persons
by ability and age
(in %, avg 1996-2007)
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Figure C.3: Unemployment rate among individu-
als of age 15 to 64 without higher sec-
ondary degree (in %)
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Figure C.4: Hours worked per week
(a) per person by age (dependent employment, avg
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C.2 Education rate: the participation rate in education in hours
The participation rate in education in hours multiplies the participation rate in persons by age
by actual to potential hours studied by age. As we only want to consider time spent in educa-
tion that actually leads to the accumulation of human capital i.e. the e↵ective time spent in
education, this result is multiplied by the completion rate. The completion rate is the fraction of
students that is expected to graduate. This completion rate is set to 0.7, the average observed in
Belgium during 1996-2007 (OECD Education at a Glance 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2007, 2009).
In the calculations of the participation rate in persons, we assume the typical high ability indi-
vidual is enrolled in tertiary education while the typical medium ability individual is enrolled in
post-secondary non-tertiary education. The participation rate in persons by ability is then calcu-
lated as the total number of students in full-time equivalents in one of both categories divided by
the total number of individuals of medium or high ability aged 18 to 29. If we, however, observe
a participation rate in tertiary education in the data over 33%, we allot this surplus to medium
ability individuals to be consistent with our assumption that every innate ability group consists
of one third of the population. Actual to potential hours consists of two parts: actual divided by
potential hours per week and actual divided by potential weeks per year. The first part we set
to 0.7. For the second part, we rely on the assumption that individuals study 42 out of 52 weeks.
Data source: Participation rate in education in persons by age : OECD (Education and Skills,
Students enrolled by age).
D Data on demography, fiscal policy and pensions
Demography
ft: fertility rates
Data source: population by age since 1948 (Bevolkingsvooruitzichten 2015-2060 of the Belgian
Federal Planning Bureau and Statistics Belgium)
Computation: We divided the population of age 18 to 20 during three years by the population
of age 18 to 20 in the previous three years. The fertility rates are displayed in Figure 6. As
to the impact of migration, both natives and immigrants of age 18 to 20 are included in the
youngest generation. They a↵ect population dynamics in our model. People who enter or leave
the country after the age of 20 do not. Children of immigrants are included in the fertility rate
when they become 18.
srtj : conditional survival rates
Data sources: Statistics Belgium, Mortality rates before 1998 are by age category (sometimes 4
years, sometimes 5) and start from 1946. As of 1998 data are annual. Prospects were provided by
the Belgian Federal Planning Bureau and Statistics Belgium (Bevolkingsvoorzichten 2015-2060).
Computation: Survival rates were calculated by substracting the mortality rate from 1. Some
conditional survival rates are shown in Figure 5.
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Fiscal policy and pensions
 t: overall average household tax rate on gross labour income (% of gross wage)
Data sources : OECD Government Revenue Statistics, Details of tax revenue - Belgium, and
OECD Economic Outlook (available via OECD.Stat).
Computation: Total tax revenues of individuals on income and profits (code 1110) plus social
security contributions (code 2100) are divided by the gross wage bill.
⌧p: employer social contribution rate ( % of gross wage)
Data sources : OECD Government Revenue Statistics, Details of tax revenue - Belgium, and
OECD Economic Outlook (available via OECD.Stat).
Computation: we divide the social contributions paid by employers (code 2200) by private gross
wage bill (the gross wage bill minus government wages).
⌧c: Consumption tax rate (in %)
Data source: McDaniel (2007, updated 2014).
⌧k: Tax rate on capital returns
Data sources: after 1982: e↵ective marginal corporate tax rates taken from Devereux et al.
(2002). The data for 1970-1981 were extrapolated based on the evolution of Belgium’s statutory
corporate income tax rates.
gc, gy: government consumption and productive expenditures
Data sources: expenditures on education (NBB, Belgische Ec. Stat. and OECD, National
Accounts at a Glance, General government expenditure by function, education); net fixed cap-
ital formation (OECD Economic Outlook No 98); government consumption (OECD, Economic
Outlook No 98)
Computation: Government productive expenditures are calculated as the sum of expenditures
on education and net fixed capital formation. The data on government consumption are net of
consumption in education as this is regarded as being productive.
rrL, rrM , rrH : net own-earnings related pension replacement rates
Data sources and description: OECD Pensions at a Glance (2005,2007,2009,2013) presents net
pension replacement rates for individuals at various multiples of average individual earnings in
the economy. Taking into account that relative to average earnings, earnings of the low (no
upper secondary degree), medium (upper secondary degree) and high ability group (tertiary
degree) are 86%, 95% and 122% (OECD Education at a Glance, 2011), we consider the data for
individuals at 87,5% of average earnings as representative for the low ability group, individuals
with average earnings as representative for the medium ability group, and individuals with 125%
of average earnings as representative for the high ability group. Country studies show the com-
position (sources) of this net replacement rate. Our proxy for rrs includes all earnings-related
pensions and mandatory occupational pensions when they depend on wages or hours worked.
Data before 2002 are extrapolated using Scruggs (2007), Ebbinghaus and Gronwald (2009), and
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Cantillon et al. (1987).
b: Gross unemployment benefit replacement rate for the low ability group
Data sources and description: OECD Database on Benefit Entitlements and Gross Replacement
Rates for data going from 1961 to 2007. The reference earnings are 67% of average earnings.
For 2008-2014, we extrapolate this data series with the trend observed in the gross replacement
rates for an individual that has average earnings (OECD Benefits and Wages, Gross Replacement
Rates). In model period 14, (1 ⌧w,L b)/2 is added as a bonus to the benefit replacement rate as
to account for the Belgian redundancy pay system (stelsel van werkloosheid met bedrijfstoeslag
or SWT).
B: General government consolidated gross debt in % of GDP
Data source: EU Commission, AMECO, series UDGGL.
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E E↵ects of demographic change at the level of
individual cohorts
Figure E.5: Life-cycle profiles of the youngest cohort (of high ability) in 1966, 1981, 1996 and 2011
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Note: each panel of this figure shows the evolution of annual hours worked, education time or
consumption over a representative individual’s life. The horizontal axis represents the individ-
ual’s age. We consider individuals who enter our model (at age 18) in 1966-68, 1981-83, 1996-98
and 2011-13. The full black line is our baseline simulation, the dotted line the ’no demographic
change’ counterfactual.
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